Bargaining Over New Ideas: Rent Distribution and Stability of Innovative Firms by Baccara, Mariagiovanna & Razin, Ronny
Bargaining Over New Ideas:
Rent Distribution and Stability of Innovative Firms1
Mariagiovanna Baccara2 and Ronny Razin3
This version: May 2006
1Previous drafts of this paper have circulated under the title "From Thought to Practice: Appropriation
and Endogenous Market Structure with Imperfect Intellectual Property Rights”. We are grateful to Patrick
Bolton, Gene Grossman, Alessandro Lizzeri and Wolfgang Pesendorfer for advising us on this project. We
also thank Jim Anton, Jean-Pierre Benoit, Kfir Eliaz, Faruk Gul, Hugo Hopenhayn, Gilat Levy, Marciano
Siniscalchi, Jan Zabojnik and the participants of seminars at Princeton University, New York University,
Rutgers University, Carnegie Mellon University, Washington University, University of Southern California,
Columbia University, University of Toronto, Stanford University, University of Rochester, Bocconi Univer-
sity, Tel Aviv University, Pompeu Fabra University, the 2003 ASSA meetings, the 2002 SED meetings and
the 2001 SAET Conference. Finally we thank the editor and two anonymous referees.
2Corresponding Author. Department of Economics, Stern School of Managment, New York University,
44 West Fourth Street, Room 7-72, New York, NY 10012. E-mail: mbaccara@stern.nyu.edu.
3Department of Economics, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United
Kingdom. Email: r.razin@lse.ac.uk.
Abstract
We analyze a model of bargaining over new ideas. The model accounts for the problem of in-
formation leakage, i.e., the diffusion of information about the idea before and after the idea is
implemented. We analyze the effects of information leakage on the distribution of rents within
firms and the firms’ stability to the introduction of innovation. In the model, the distribution of
rents in a firm reflects the distribution of information about the idea. We show how the balance
of power between the innovators and their collaborators depends on market conditions and firms’
size. The model also provides a formal link between the organization of firms and their stability:
the model predicts that, a larger firm will tend to be less stable to the introduction of innovation.
1 Introduction
Innovation starts with ideas. Before an idea is developed into a product, innovators often need
to bargain over its future rents and to involve others in the new project. In the absence of
perfect intellectual property rights, such a bargaining process is characterized by the presence of
information leakage— that is, the diffusion of information both before and after an agreement has
been reached. In this paper, we develop a general model of bargaining with information leakage
over the expected rents of new ideas.
Understanding the effect of information leakage on bargaining is essential to the analysis of the
formation of firms, as well as of their evolution and performance. Information leakage affects the
distribution of rents when a new firm forms. Once a firm is formed, further innovation can affect
it in two fundamental ways. First, innovation brings about changes to the firms’ internal structure
and distribution of rents. New players are brought in to the pictures, while the contracts of others
in the firm are revaluated.1
A second issue relates to the effect of innovation on the firms’ stability. A key focus of the
literature about the high-tech industry has been the stability of firms involved in innovative
activity.2 Moreover, it has been suggested that large incumbent firms are disadvantaged when it
comes to introducing innovation.3 The model we develop in this paper allows us to analyze the
effect of innovation on the distribution of rents in the firm and on its stability.
Consider the following scenarios that our analysis applies to:
(1) An innovator has a new idea, and in order to develop it into a product, he needs partners.
The innovator knows that once he reveals his idea to someone, he is vulnerable to the risk of
expropriation. In the absence of perfect intellectual property rights, how much of the value of the
idea can he expect to appropriate in the formation of the new partnership? What is the effect of
different property rights on the innovator’s prospects?
(2) A firm considers implementing a new idea. For the implementation to be completed, a
1One manifestation of such changes is the so-called “founders’ syndrome” in which original founders of firms
find themselves marginalized as the firm follows new paths. See, for instance, McNamara (1999).
2The phenomenon of spin-out formation has received special attention in the literature. A big portion of the
innovation in the high-tech industry occurs through the formation of spin-outs, often implying substantial losses
for their maternal firms. This phenomenon motivated Christensen (1997) to coin the term “disruptive technology.”
3This has been termed the "Curse of Incumbency." Foster and Kaplan (2001) document that among the firms
listed in the S&P 500 in 1957, only 2% are still listed and outperformed the index average in 1997, 13% are still
listed but underperformed it, while 85% were off the list.
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certain number of people in the firm will learn the details about the idea. Will the firm be able
to stay intact and develop the technology, or will someone leave with the idea and try to develop
it outside the firm’s boundaries? What determines the stability of firms to the introduction of
innovation?
(3) An employee in a firm has an idea for a new product. He has to decide whether to reveal
his idea (and renegotiate his contract) within the firm or to leave the firm and form a spin-out.
How is the structure of the original firm going to affect the decision of the innovative employee?
Our model allows us to address these and related questions. One or more agents initially know
an idea for a business venture. This venture yields an expected return of one if only one firm
implements it. We assume that if two firms implement the idea, competition dissipates some of
the rents. The agents bargain over the rents either among themselves or with other agents who
are initially uninformed about the idea.
We analyze a sequential-offer bargaining protocol based on the following assumptions. First,
implementing the idea requires the collaboration of a certain number of agents. Second, any agent
who is not informed about the idea and who receives an offer learns about the idea (information
leakage). Third, only those who know the idea have a strictly positive probability of becoming
proposers in the bargaining.
If the first group to form does not include all the informed agents, the game continues until a
second group is formed. The game ends once either all the informed agents are part of a group
or when two groups have formed.
Our main result, Proposition 1, characterizes the symmetric subgame perfect equilibria of the
game. In the case in which the first firm to form is relatively protected (whether by the acquisition
of a patent or by some other first-mover advantage), we find a unique equilibrium. The equilibrium
has two main characteristics: (i) information diffusion occurs both on and off the equilibrium path,
and (ii) the equilibrium establishes a relation between the size of the firm and its stability. In
particular, there is a threshold for the initial group’s size above which, in equilibrium, the group
splits up and two firms form in equilibrium.
In the case in which the first firm to form is relatively unprotected, we again find a unique
equilibrium. In equilibrium, the initial group of innovators always stays intact independently of
its size. Also, in this equilibrium, information remains within the boundaries of the agents who
are informed about the idea both on and off the equilibrium path.
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We proceed by analyzing the implications of Proposition 1. We first examine the effects of
information diffusion on the distribution of rents within firms, both for the case of a sole innovator
(as in scenario (1)) and the case of a group of individuals implementing a new idea together (as in
scenario (2)). In our model, the rents are distributed according to the ex-post bargaining position
of agents that is due to their knowledge of information.
Appropriation rates of the sole innovator We find that there exist equilibrium effects that
protect the appropriation rate of innovators even in the absence of perfect intellectual property
rights on ideas. The intuition for this result lies in the anxiety of those around the bargaining
table about the implications of rejecting today’s offer. In particular, they might fear that they
will not be included in any firm that will form in the future or that more firms will form and
dissipate some of the rents.
In particular, consider the case in which the new product, once developed, is fully protected
by a patent in the final product market. We find that there is a unique symmetric equilibrium
in which the innovator always receives a surprisingly high share of the profits. In particular, if
the collaboration of two agents is necessary to develop the product, as the bargaining frictions
disappear, the share of a sole innovator goes to 1 − e−1, i.e. about 63% of the profits. If the
number of people necessary to develop the product is arbitrarily large, the appropriation rate of
the innovator is bounded below by e−1, i.e. about 37% of the profits.
The innovator’s success is due to a novel effect that is robust to the disappearance of bargaining
frictions. We refer to this effect as the Information Diffusion Advantage. The intuition behind
this effect comes from the structure of the equilibrium. Following a rejection of an offer, new
proposers always make offers to new, uninformed agents. This is because by making an offer
to an uninformed agent, a proposer is increasing the degree of competition this agent will face
upon rejection and, as a result, ensuring a lower continuation value. The ability of proposers to
credibly commit to make offers to uninformed agents implies that the innovator appropriates a
sizable share of the profits in the first offer.
Now, consider the case in which the first firm to form is not protected. Any agent who is about
to make an offer has to consider the effect of his offer on the product market structure; besides the
potential defection of the agents he hires, a proposer has to evaluate the threat of future market
competition. Thus, he faces an additional trade-off. In particular, he can either preempt the
potential competition on the final product market by hiring all the agents that could potentially
compete with him (i.e., all the informed agents), or he can form a firm in the least expensive way
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and face competition on the final product market.
We show that higher rents for the innovator can be sustained by a second effect that we term
the Threat of Competition Advantage. We show that the innovator is sometimes able to threaten
his partners with competition arising upon rejection of his offer. As competition dissipates rents,
this tends to lower the continuation value of potential employees. Thus, this threat enables the
innovator to appropriate all of the gap between monopoly rents and the total rents under market
competition. This implies that the fiercer is the potential market competition, the stronger is the
innovator’s position.
On the other hand, the threat of competition is not always credible. In particular, when the
degree of potential market competition is very high, upon rejection of an offer, agents always
have incentives to avoid competition. We show that in this case both the information diffusion
and market competition advantages cease to hold. This pushes the innovators’ payoffs to the
minimum.
The distribution of rents in the firm. Our analysis yields the rent distribution in the firm
endogenously. Proposition 1 implies a connection between the market environment and the dis-
tribution of rents in firms. In particular, we show that the balance of power between innovators
and their collaborators favors the former for intermediate levels of protection of new firms. On the
other hand, when there is either full protection or no protection of new firms, the collaborators
are able to extract more rents due to the presence of information leakage.
The distribution of rents in the firm that is due to innovation is important for several reasons.
In Section 4.1.3, we present an example that shows how the presence of information leakage,
through its effect on the distribution of rents, can affect the firms’ performance.4 Moreover, in
Baccara and Razin (2006) we analyze the implications of the above results to the incentives within
the firm towards the introduction of innovation.
The stability of an innovative firm. Our results link the stability of an innovative firm to its
organization and to the degree of protection of new firms in the market. First, the number of
people involved in the creation of new ideas in the firm is critical to answer the questions posed in
scenario (2). Proposition 1 shows that as this number increases, so does the tendency of firms to
split up. This tendency depends on variables such as the firm’s size and organizational structure.
4This observation is consistent with the well-known comparison between Silicon Valley’s success and Route 128
decline. Many legal scholars (see Saxenian (1996)) relate the different success of the regions to the relatively weak
enforcement of IPR in California versus the stricter regine in Massachusetts.
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Second, our analysis predicts that when the degree of market competition is relatively high,
firms will tend to stay intact. When, on the other hand, the degree of potential competition in the
final product market is low, we show that the firms are unstable and competition will arise. This
result runs counter to the notion of bargaining efficiency, as competition entails rent dissipation.
In this respect, our analysis highlights an important implication of information leakage as a reason
for the breakdown of bargaining efficiency.
One way in which firms split up in practice is by the formation of spin-outs by employees, as
highlighted in scenario (3). To analyze such a phenomenon, we address the case in which one
employee of a firm has a new idea. Our results suggest that an innovative employee is more likely
to form a spin-out the higher the number of agents involved in the intra-firm decision making
process— i.e., when the original firm is large or bureaucratic. When, on the other hand, the firm is
small and/or the decision-making power is concentrated, innovation is more likely to be disclosed
within the firm.
This paper is organized as follows. After a literature review, we present the main model in
Section 2. In Section 3, we present the results. In Section 4, we analyze the implications of our
results to the distribution of rents and the stability of the innovative firm. Finally, in Section 5,
we discuss some normative implications, extensions of the model and modeling assumptions. We
conclude in Section 6.
1.1 Related literature
The literature on the informational concerns of innovators is both young and sparse. The first
papers to approach the informational concerns of inventors in the absence of intellectual property
rights are Arrow (1962), Nitzan and Pakes (1983) and, more recently, Anton and Yao (1994 and
1995).5
Anton and Yao (1994, 1995) are the first to model explicitly the bargaining mechanism by
which innovators implement their ideas in the presence of information leakage. Anton and Yao
(1994) shows how an innovator can appropriate a substantial share of the rents of his ideas by
threatening to generate more competition on the product market. Anton and Yao (1995) applies
a similar logic to a model in which the innovator works for a firm and has the option to implement
the idea by himself in a spin-out.
5See also d’Aspremont, Bhattacharya and Gerard-Varet (2000) for a different approach to information diffusion
by voluntary disclosure.
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In both these papers, the firm is modeled as a unitary agent that reacts to the actions of
the innovator. This implies that there is a fundamental asymmetry between innovators and firms
because firms do not face the problem of information leakage as innovators do. In contrast, our aim
is to develop a general framework to model information leakage among individuals. These could
be collaborators or decision-makers within the firm as well as any potential partner outside the
firm. This generality allows us to yield predictions about the connection between the organization
of the firm and the implementation of innovation.
Our model also relates to the notion that a firm’s employees could be tempted to appropriate
the firm’s source of the rent. Rajan and Zingales (2001) analyze the optimal design of a hierarchy
to prevent employees from doing so. The difference to our analysis is reflected in the modeling
assumptions: in their model, employees bargain on their wage after deciding whether to stay in
the firm or to defect. In our model, the defection decision can occur at any moment between
the bargaining and the completion of the development process, so it affects the outcome of the
bargaining.6
Several papers offer competitive treatments of information diffusion. In particular, Chari and
Hopenhayn (1991) and Jovanovic and McDonald (1994) study the dynamics of the diffusion of new
technologies. More recently, Boldrin and Levin 2003 (see also 2004) construct a competitive model
of innovation and growth in which innovative products can be either consumed or duplicated and
sold on a competitive market.
We think that a better understanding of the strategic issues underlying information diffusion
can shed more light on the macro implications of such a phenomenon. In particular, this paper
develops a methodology that can potentially be applied to understanding a wide set of issues
related to innovation and IPR. As a first step in this direction, in Baccara and Razin (2006),
we apply the methodology developed in this paper to the problem of incremental research and
incentives to innovate in established firms.
6For other papers that relate the possibility of employees’ defection to the distribution of wages within the firm,
see Stole and Zweibel (1994), Wolinsky (2000) and Zabojnik (2002). In particular, Zabojnik (2002) explores how
hierarchical firms pay employees efficiency wages in accordance with the potential threat of their leaving the firm
with relevant information.
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2 The Model
In this section, we introduce our model of bargaining with information leakage. Three assumptions
underlie our bargaining protocol.7 First, we assume that no agent can develop an idea into a
product on his own. Second, we assume that the act of recruiting entails sharing information
about the idea. The final assumption relates to the asymmetry between informed and uninformed
agents. As the only element differentiating otherwise homogeneous agents is the knowledge of the
idea, we capture this asymmetry by assuming that offers can be made only by informed agents.8
In the model, which is based on a multi-agent alternating-offer bargaining protocol, upon each
rejection, the next proposer is chosen randomly by Nature.9 The novelty in this model is that
the set of those who can make offers is endogenous and expands as the game progresses; in each
period of the game, an agent is chosen among all the agents that know about the idea to make
the next offer.
We now present the model in detail. Let us consider a finite set of n > 2 agents, denoted by
N , among which there is a set of innovators K0 = {1, 2, .., k0} that have an idea for a business
venture. All the agents in N\K0 are initially unaware of the business idea. If developed, this idea
can be implemented into one or more marketable products. The process of developing the idea
requires the work of m+ 1 < n agents, where m ≥ 1. We initially assume that m = 1 and relax
this assumption in Section 4.
We assume that knowledge of the idea is necessary for any group of agents to develop it. Thus,
if all the informed agents are in one firm, this firm enjoys a monopoly in the product market. Any
knowledgeable agent who is not part of an existing firm can always try to form her own firm and
develop the same or a similar product. This new firm will compete to some degree with the first
firm on the final product market.
For simplicity, we assume that the market can accommodate only two firms. Obviously, there
will be an advantage to being the first firm that develops the product. This advantage depends
on the technology produced, the market demand characteristics and intellectual property rights’
enforcement. We normalize the present value of all the profits earned by the first firm if the
second firm never enters the market to be equal to 1. Let π2 be the present value of all the profits
7The assumptions of this model are discussed further in Section 5.
8Uninformed agents are unaware of the existence of the idea or of its potential profitability. They become aware
of it only when approached by an informed agent.
9See, for instance, Baron and Ferejohn (1989).
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earned by the second firm in competition. Then, notice that the present value of all the profits
earned by the first firm increases with the delay with which the second firm enters the market.
We let π1 ≤ 1 be the present value of all the profits of the first firm if a second firm forms after
one period. We assume π1 ≥ π2 and π1 + π2 ≤ 1.10
The structure of the game builds recursively on two types of negotiation subgames. What
distinguishes the two types of subgames is whether or not one firm has already formed.
Suppose that we are at some history along the game at which a firm has not yet formed and the
set of the informed agents— i.e., the agents who know the idea— is K 0 ⊇ K0. We are now ready to
introduce the first negotiation subgame. We assume that nature chooses with equal probability
among the informed agents in K 0 the next agent to make an offer. The chosen agent, say agent
i ∈ K 0, can propose a division of the surplus, α, to a subset of agents C 0 ⊂ N\{i}, including at
least m agents. An offer is fully represented by the pair (C 0, α). The agents in C 0 have to decide
simultaneously whether to reject or to accept the offer. The crucial assumption in this model is
that all of the agents who receive an offer become informed, and the set of the informed agents
becomes C 0 ∪K 0. If at least one agent in C 0 rejects the offer, they enter a negotiation subgame
in which no firm has formed. If all accept, then the first firm is formed, and two resulting cases
are possible.
If C 0 ⊇ K 0\ {i}— i.e. all the other informed agents are included in the offer— then the game
ends; the firm implements the idea and enjoys a monopoly status. Any agent j ∈ C 0 receives αj ,
agent i receives (1 −
P
j∈C0 αj), and agents in N\ (C 0 ∪ {i}) receive zero. We refer to an offer
such that C 0 ⊇ K 0\ {i} as a “grand coalition” offer. If C 0 + K 0\ {i}, not all the informed agents
become part of the first firm. The informed agents that are not part of the first firm can continue
to negotiate until they form a second firm. We, therefore, enter a second type of negotiation
subgame in which one firm has already been formed and for which the set of informed agents
left in the game is K 0\ (C 0 ∪ {i}) . In any terminal node following this history, agent i receives
(1−
P
j∈C0 αj)π1 and any agent j ∈ C 0 receives αjπ1.We refer to an offer such that C 0 + K 0\ {i}
as a “sub-coalition” offer.
Let us now introduce the second type of negotiation subgame. Such subgames ensue after some
10These profits should be interpreted as incorporating any downstream effects due to imitation. Also, observe
that 1− π1 is a measure of the cost of competition for an incumbent firm. Since the first firm to form chooses the
most profitable project, π1 ≥ π2 and competition implies π1 + π2 ≤ 1. See Section 5.2 for a discussion of the case
in which π1 + π2 > 1.
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agent i has already formed a firm making a successful offer to the set of agents C 0. Let K 00 be
the set of informed agents left in the game. With equal probability, an agent l is chosen from
K 00 to propose a division of the surplus to a set of agents C00 ⊂ N\(C 0 ∪ {i} ∪ {l}), including
at least m agents. Let β be the proposed division. If everybody accepts the offer, the game
ends, agent l receives (1 −
P
j∈C00 βj)π2, and any agent j ∈ C 00 receives βjπ2. All the agents in
N\(C0 ∪C 00 ∪ {i}∪ {l}) receive zero. If someone in C 00 rejects offer β, then we enter a negotiation
subgame in which one firm has formed and for which the set of informed agents is K 00 ∪ C 00.
Note that we use unanimity as the rule that governs the formation of a firm, so that the offers
are conditional upon the acceptance of all the agents involved. This implies that agents cannot
make offers that are binding as soon as at least one agent accepts it (“unconditional offer”).11
The game begins with a negotiation subgame for which the set of informed agents is K0. We
assume that, due to impatience, there are frictions in the bargaining represented by a common
discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). Every time we enter a negotiation subgame, payoffs in that subgame
are discounted by δ. If no agreement is reached, we assume payoffs are zero. All the agents have
reservation values normalized to zero and are risk-neutral.
To analyze this model, we look at Symmetric Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SSPE).12 Among the
SSPE, we look at those in which agents do not use weakly dominated actions when responding
to offers.13
For any player i ∈ N, a strategy si is defined for all histories at which agent i takes an action.
For any history h, in which nature chooses the next proposer, let k(h) denote the number of
informed agents at that history, and let K(h) denote the set of these agents. In the analysis of
the model, we compute the continuation values of the players at such histories. We denote the
continuation value of an informed agent i at a given history h as vi (h) . A property of the SSPE
is that for any such history h, all the informed agents have the same continuation value— i.e.,
vi (h) = vj (h) = v (h) for all i, j ∈ K (h).
11 In Section 5, we discuss this assumption in detail.
12For the formal definition of SSPE we refer to the Appendix. In Section 5, we discuss the implications of
restricting attention to SSPE.
13We want to rule out equilibria that are sustained by the mere fact that agents are not pivotal. For example,
one can sustain equilibria in which offers to more than one agent are never accepted by any agent. These strategies
could be chosen in equilibrium as, by our unanimity assumption, no agent is pivotal in the acceptance or rejection
of such offer. By assuming away weakly dominated actions, we guarantee that an agent who desires the offer to be
accepted votes in its favor.
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3 Main Results
In this section, we derive the main result of the model. In Proposition 1, we characterize the set
of equilibria. For simplicity, here we describe the conditions for n arbitrarily large, while in the
Appendix, we present the result and the proof for any n.
Proposition 1 (i) When π1 > 1−δ
2π2
1+δ , there is a unique SSPE. In this equilibrium, there is
a k¯ such that in any subgame with k > k¯ informed agents, the proposers always make offers
to an uninformed agent. (ii) When π1 < 1 − δ, there is a unique SSPE. In this equilibrium,
proposers always make grand coalition offers that include only informed agents. (iii) When π1 ∈
(1−δ, 1−δ2π21+δ ), there are multiple equilibria. In particular, there exist both a SSPE in which offers
are made to only uninformed agents and a SSPE in which offers are made to a grand coalition.
To understand this result, it is instructive to look at the extreme configurations of the model’s
parameters. Consider first the case in which π1 = 1— i.e., when the new product is fully protected
against competition. Let us denote by vk the continuation value of an informed agent at a history
in which there are k informed players and nature is about to choose the next proposer. To build
the unique equilibrium sequence {vk}nk=k0 of the continuation values of each informed player, start
with n informed agents. When everybody is informed, symmetry guarantees that the continuation
value of every player is vn = δn , i.e., 1/n-th fraction of the discounted pie δ.
When n− 1 agents are informed, consider the options of a proposer. He can either form a firm
only with one or more informed agents, or he can include an uninformed agent in his offer. If the
offer includes the uninformed agent, every agent has to be paid vn = δn . Suppose that he offers
only to informed agents. Upon rejection, each of them is chosen as next proposer with probability
1
n−1 . In that event, each can guarantee himself at least 1 −
δ
n by making an offer to the only
uninformed agent. Thus, the amount δn−1
¡
1− δn
¢
represents a lower bound of the continuation
value of an informed agent. However, as δn−1
¡
1− δn
¢
> δn , it is always optimal to offer to the only
uninformed agent. This implies that vn−1 = δn−1
¡
1− δn
¢
.
Working backwards by induction on the number of informed agents, assume that k < n agents
are informed, and the continuation value sequence is defined by vl = δl (1− vl+1) for all l ∈
{k + 1, .., n− 1}. Again, by making an offer to an informed agent, a proposer has to pay him at
least δk (1− vk+1), and it can be shown that
δ
k (1− vk+1) > vk+1. This implies that it is always
optimal to make an offer to an uninformed rather than an informed agent (i.e., information diffuses
off the equilibrium path) and that vk = δk (1− vk+1) for all k ∈ {2, .., n− 1}. Moreover, since the
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sequence {vj}nj=k+1 displays the property lvk+l > (l + 1) vk+l+1 for any l ≥ 1, it is not optimal to
make an offer to more than one agent.
By the analysis above, when π1 = 1, informed agents always make offers to uninformed agents
in any subgame (i.e., k¯ = 1). When π1 < 1, a trade-off will emerge between grand coalition offers
and offers to uninformed agents. As the number of informed agents increases, the cost of grand
coalition offers does too. Thus, agents will tend to make sub-coalition offers and, in that case,
the cost of a sub-coalition offer is minimized if it is made to uninformed agents. Therefore, k¯
represents the cut-off above which grand coalition offers become too expensive and agents start
to make offers to uninformed agents.
Note that we can interpret the equilibrium described above in the following way. An agent who
is in the position to make an offer is able to credibly threaten the recipients of the offer; if they
reject the offer, future offers will be made to different agents and, as a result, they cannot be
assured to be included in the firm in the future. The proof sketched above shows why, when π1
is large enough, such threats are credible. However, when π1 is low, these threats are no longer
credible as agents tend to make grand coalition offers: indeed, the cost of making a grand-coalition
offer never exceeds δ, while a sub-coalition offer guarantees at most π1. Therefore, if π1 < 1− δ,
no agent would ever make a sub-coalition offer, no matter how many informed agents there are on
the market, and grand coalition offers are always made in every SP equilibrium. Note also that
point (ii) of Proposition 1 guarantees that when π1 < 1− δ, the equilibrium grand coalition offers
are never extended to any uninformed agent. This equilibrium feature of case (ii) has important
implications that we explore and discusse in the next section.
Finally, for intermediate values of π1, different equilibria can be sustained by sustaining different
credible threats. To give the intuition for this result, consider an equilibrium in which two firms
arise in equilibrium. One can sustain competition using the following strategies. As long as
proposers make sub-coalition offers, the continuation game involves future sub-coalition offers.
This entails a large share of the profits to the proposers. But proposers may be tempted to go
for a grand-coalition offer. Such behavior is discouraged by the threat that if such offers are
made, continuation games will involve further grand coalition offers that tend to increase the
continuation value of those who are part of the initial offer.
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4 Implications
In this section, we focus on two effects of information leakage on firms. First, we analyze the
implication of Proposition 1 on the distribution of rents in firms. In our model, the distribution
of rents in the firm is determined by the ex-post bargaining positions in the firm due to the
knowledge of information. On the one hand, innovators bring the new information to light and
enjoy a first-mover advantage. On the other hand, new agents who are recruited in order to
implement the new idea enjoy some bargaining power vis-à-vis others due to their newly acquired
knowledge of the information.
Second, we analyze the stability of firms with respect to the introduction of an innovation.
The choice of informed agents between remaining within the confines of the firm or opting out
implies that the firm’s organization might influence its ability to stay intact. We examine this
question from two perspectives: first, we examine whether a group of informed agents will decide
to implement the idea together; next, we examine the incentives of an inspired employee to either
disclose his idea within the firm or implement the idea outside the firm.
4.1 Distribution of Rents in Firms
We now consider the implications of Proposition 1 for the distribution of rents within the firm.
It is instructive to start our analysis with a sole innovator, as it will allow us to examine the
balance of power between innovators and their recruits. To this end, we focus on the case of
k0 = 1 and m > 1. Below, we show that the innovator’s ability to appropriate rents depends
on two equilibrium effects: (a) the information diffusion advantage relates to the ability of the
innovator to threaten his collaborators that if they do not abide by his offer, then they will not
be guaranteed to be part of any future firm formed, as more and more people will be informed
of the idea; and (b) the market competition advantage relates to the ability of the innovator to
threaten his collaborators that if they do not abide by his offer, rents will be dissipated due to
the emergence of two firms competing in the market.
4.1.1 The Information Diffusion Advantage
To illustrate the information diffusion advantage, we consider the case in which π1 = 1. This case
occurs, for instance, when the first firm to form is protected either by intellectual property rights
or by other first-mover advantages (e.g., on the demand side). In this case, Proposition 1 can be
12
generalized to the case of m > 1 as follows.
Proposition 2 When π1 = 1, there is a unique SSPE. In this equilibrium, in any subgame, the
proposers always make offers to m uninformed agents.
In the above equilibrium, the innovator’s appropriation rate is 1−mvm+1. Since the sequence
{vk}nk=2 is a function of m, n and of the discount factor δ, let us denote the appropriation rate
v (m, δ, n) ≡ 1 − mvm+1. We use the notation v (m, δ,∞) ≡ limn→∞ v (m, δ, n), v (∞, δ,∞) ≡
limm→∞ v (m, δ,∞), etc.
Corollary 3 When π1 = 1, the initial innovator always appropriates more than a share 1m+1 of
the profit. When n becomes arbitrarly large, the innovator’s share is bounded above by 1 − e−δ
and bounded below by e−δ. The upper bound is achieved when m = 1, and the lower bound when
m becomes arbitrarily large.
Corollary 3 implies that in the absence of both first-mover advantage and legal protection, the
innovator enjoys an advantage that is driven by equilibrium incentives. Even for large m, and as
the bargaining frictions disappear, the presence of the information diffusion advantage keeps the
appropriation rate of the innovator bounded away from zero.
The source of the innovator’s ability to appropriate rents is his ability to take advantage of
his collaborators’ anxiety about what will happen upon rejection. This anxiety is a result of
the presence of information diffusion. Indeed, upon the rejection of the innovator’s offer, each
recipient knows that with probability mm+1 he is not going to become the next proposer; in that
case, the next proposer is going to make an offer to uninformed agents, leaving that agent with
a payoff of zero. This effect tends to lower the bargaining position of the agents the innovator
involves in his first offer. Indeed, let us compare the above result to a model in which m = 1 and
n = 2. In this case, there is no scope for information to diffuse. Indeed, it is easy to see that
in the only SPE, proposers always offer δ2 , and agents always accept the offer. As the players
get more patient (δ tends to 1), the first-mover advantage of the first proposer vanishes, and his
payoff goes to 12 .
4.1.2 The Market Competition Advantage
Consider, now, the case in which there is little protection on the final product market— that is,
π1 < 1. In this section, we show how the threat of market competition affects the innovator’s
payoff.
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We start the discussion with an observation: if exactly two agents are informed, the continuation
value of each of them is at most δ2 . This implies that the innovator can always secure 1 −
δ
2 by
offering δ2 to one agent.
14 Thus, v (δ) ≡ 1− δ2 represents a lower bound of the appropriation rate
of a single innovator.
To see how the threat of market competition affects the innovator’s appropriation rate, we first
consider the equilibria when π1 is relatively large.
Proposition 4 There exists a π¯ < 1 such that if π1 > π¯, there is a unique SSPE. In this
equilibrium, in any subgame, the proposers always make offers to m uninformed agents and the
innovator’s appropriation rate is decreasing in both π1 and π2.
Let us now look more carefully at the appropriation rate of the innovator in this equilibrium.
Note that the generic element of the sequence {vk}nk=2 for large n is
vk = π1[
∞X
i=1
(−1)i−1δi(k − 1)!
(k − 1 + i)! +
∞X
i=1
δi
k
]
+π2
∞X
i=1
(k + i)
∞X
j=1
δj
(k + i)!
(k + i+ j)!
(−1)j−1))
The innovator’s appropriation rate is given by
v(δ,∞) = 1− v2 > 1−
δ
2
= v (δ)
The innovator’s ability to guarantee a share larger than 1− δ2 is now due to two distinct effects.
The first effect, the information diffusion advantage, was introduced in the previous section. This
effect allows the innovator to appropriate more than half of the surplus of the continuation game,
i.e. π1 + δπ2.
However, the innovator’s share of the profits is even higher. The innovator is able to appropriate
also the entire gap between monopoly profits and the surplus under competition, i.e., 1−(π1+δπ2).
This is because the innovator can credibly threaten a potential employee that if he rejects his offer,
competition will arise on the final product market.15
Note that the continuation value of the potential employee is increasing in both π1 and π2.
When competition arises in any subgame, the total pie divided among agents is π1+δπ2. Therefore,
as the value of the pie increases, the agents’ continuation values increase as well. As a result, the
14Note that this is a result of the assumption that only one agent is needed in the production function. When
the production function involves more and more agents, the minimum payoff an agent can secure tends to be 1− δ.
15This effect is reminiscent of a similar effect in Anton and Yao (1994).
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innovator’s appropriation rate decreases in both π1 and π2. As π1 and π2 decrease, the threat
of competition in the subgame that ensues in case of a rejection becomes more powerful. This
enables the innovator to pay his employees less and, therefore, increase his own share of the profit.
The link between fiercer potential competition on the market and higher bargaining power of
the innovators is very intuitive. Anton and Yao (1994) consider a similar effect and show that
fiercer competition on the market cannot hurt the innovator and often strengthens his position.
However, point (ii) of Proposition 1 implies that for high degrees of potential market compe-
tition, the threat of competition ceases to be credible. As a result, the innovator’s position is
compromised, and he is unable to appropriate the gap between the monopoly and competition
rents.
Corollary 5 If π1 < 1− δ, the appropriation rate of a single innovator is 1− δ2 .
Corollary 5 follows directly from point (ii) of Proposition 1. One could think that even when
grand coalition offers are made in equilibrium, proposers may still extend the offers to uninformed
agents to lower the continuation value of every agent included in their offer. However, when grand
coalition offers are made along the equilibrium path, the continuation value of the agents included
in the offer are relatively high (that is, equal to δ1+k when k agents are informed). This prevents
the proposers from extending the offer to more individuals than necessary. This implies that
information diffusion advantage and market competition advantage cease to hold at the same
time, leaving the innovator’s appropriation level at the lowest possible level— that is, equal to
1− δ2 .
Finally, Proposition 1 implies that for values of π1 in the interval [1−δ, 1−δ
2π2
1+δ ], one can sustain
equilibria in which the innovator appropriates the minimum appropriation rate, 1− δ2 , as well as
equilibria in which he is able to appropriate more than that.
In the middle range, a competitive market outcome is sustainable only if the number of informed
agents is high enough. However, Proposition 1 shows that there are equilibria in which a single
innovator can still benefit from it. In fact, in the equilibrium we present in the Appendix, the
innovator’s payoff is higher than 1 − δ2 even if a competitive market outcome can be sustained
only for a high enough number of informed agents. The innovator’s success is again due to the
information diffusion and the threat of competition advantages.
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4.1.3 The Distribution of Rents in the Firm
The analysis carried out above highlights a clear relationship between the market conditions and
the distribution of rents within a new firm. In particular, the distribution of rents will tends to
be relatively more egalitarian in the extreme configuration of the parameter space— i.e., when
the potential competition on the product market is either fierce (neither information diffusion
advantage nor threat of market competition is present) or when it is non-existent (only information
diffusion advantage is present). For intermediate values of market competition, the balance of
power in the firm discriminates between the innovators and their collaborators because for these
parameters information diffusion advantage is present and threat of market competition is at its
peak.
The distribution of rents and effort extraction. Our model pins down the endogenous distrib-
ution of rents that arises in the absence of property rights. The distribution of rents in the firm
has important implications for the firms’ performance.
Here, we present a simple example to illustrate the effect of information leakage on the firm’s
performance of when an investment is required from both employer and employee to produce the
product. The point of this example is that weak protection of intellectual property rights and the
presence of information leakage alter the incentives to exert effort and may indeed improve the
efficiency of production in a firm.16
Consider a situation in which a non-contractable effort from two agents is required to carry out
the development of a product. Assume that the production function is V
¡
eE, eW
¢
=
¡
eEeW
¢ 1
2 ,
where eE , eW ∈ <+ are the efforts of the employer and employee, respectively. The cost of effort
is the same for both agents involved in the production, and it is defined by c (e) = e
2
2 , where
e = eE, eW . The first best effort levels
¡
eE∗, eW∗
¢
maximize V
¡
eE, eW
¢
− (e
E)2
2 −
(eW )2
2 and they
are eE∗ = eW∗ = 1/2.
Without the presence of information leakage— that is, when intellectual property rights are
perfectly enforced— the employer chooses the share, x ∈ [0, 1] of the employee. By solving the
employer’s problem, it is easy to see that he offers the employee the share x∗ = 1/4.
16Aghion and Tirole (1994) and Lester and Talley (2001) suggest that different allocations of property rights could
help to improve the inefficiency that results when uncontractable effort goes into the production function. However,
these papers take an optimal contract approach and compare exogenously given property rights allocations. Here,
we argue that when intellectual property rights are weak, the presence of information leakage itself can endogenously
deliver a more equal division of the value and sometime improve the efficiency of production.
16
Consider now the case in which there is information leakage and a patent is granted at the
end of the development process— that is, π1 = 1— and focus on an example in which n = 3. Let
us consider a strategy profile in which proposers always offer an uninformed agent the minimum
between his continuation value (i.e., vk) and 1/4. 17
Proposition 6 There exist δ such that if δ ≥ δ there is an equilibrium in which the firm’s
production is more efficient in the presence of information leakage than in the no-leakage case.
In this example, the presence of information leakage improves efficiency by guaranteeing a more
equal distribution of the proceeds of an idea. In general, when more equal shares imply higher
production, a weak property regime will lead to better performances of the firm.
4.2 Innovation and Firm Stability
In this Section we discuss the implications of Proposition 1 on the stability of a firm with respect
to the implementation of innovation. In particular, first we consider the case in which a firm is
considering implementing a new product. Since the implementation implies the diffusion of the
information throughout the firm, we address the issue of the stability of the firm as a group to
the implementation of the innovation. Second, we focus on a single innovative employee within a
firm and we study how the firm organization affects his incentive to implement his idea within or
outside the firm.
4.2.1 Stability of an Innovative Firm
We now consider the situation in which innovation arises in a firm composed by k individuals and
we analyze the stability of this group to the introduction of new ideas.
Proposition 1 implies that two parameters affect the stability of innovative firms. First, the
number of the agents in the firm who know and can possibly implement the idea is important
(the parameter k). When π1 is relatively large, if more than k¯ in the firm are informed about
the idea, the result will be that some will leave the firm and competition will ensue. The model,
therefore, formalizes the connection between the organization or size of the firm and its stability.
17Moreover, employees always accept if and only if offered at least their continuation value. If everybody
is informed, offerers always choose one employee by selecting him randomly between the other two agents
with the same probability.
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This result is in line with the stylized facts about high-tech industries, which suggest that large
established firms often innovate less than younger and smaller competitors.
Second, market conditions also affect the stability of firms. The fiercer is the competition when
two firms compete for the same product, the more the firm is able to stay intact. In particular,
when π1 < 1− δ, the firm always stays intact, irrespective of its size. This implies that firms will
tend to be more stable in situations with weak protection of new firms.
4.2.2 Innovative Employees and Spin-out formation
Proposition 1 can be used to analyze the formation of spin-outs. Consider an employee in a firm
who is inspired by a new idea. This employee will compare the consequences of revealing the
idea inside the firm to those of leaving the firm and forming a spin-out. The consequences of
internal disclosure are given by our analysis of a subgame in which k people are informed, where
k depends on the organization of the firm and represents the number of people in the firm that will
be exposed to the idea upon disclosure (for instance, k could represent the number of managers
the employee has to talk to before obtaining an approval for the implementation of the new idea).
Our analysis provides the continuation values of the k agents in the firm and, as a consequence,
the cost of disclosing the idea internally.
The consequences of forming a spin-out are given by the analysis of the game in which k0 = 1.
Note that the payoff from a spin-out depends only on the technology of the idea (captured by the
parameter m), whereas the payoffs from internal disclosure depend, in addition, on the organiza-
tion of the firm (captured by the parameter k). Thus, our model provides a connection between
the organization of the firm and the tendency of employees to disclose innovations internally or
form spin-outs. Our model predicts that more spin-out formation is expected when the original
firm is relatively large or bureaucratic.
In addition, the model offers predictions about the effect of market conditions on the propensity
of employees to leave the firm. It is important to distinguish between two markets, who are relevant
for these prediction. The first is the market for the new product. The result of Proposition 1
implies that if k is large enough, and the first firm to implement the new idea is relatively protected
(i.e., π1 is large enough), disclosing the idea within the firm could lead to an outcome in which
the group of agents informed about the idea will tend to split generating competition on the new
product market. In such cases, employees will anticipate such changes by leaving the firm. The
second market of interest is the relation between the original firm’s product and the new products.
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The more the profits from a new product are dissipated by competition with the old product, the
less prone the employee will be to leave the firm.
5 Discussion
5.1 Welfare Implications
5.1.1 Intellectual Property Rights Protection
Our analysis suggests that incentives to innovate do not disappear even in the complete absence
of legal protection.18 Innovators are protected by their ability to take advantage of their col-
laborators’ anxiety about being included in the first firm to form and about the possibility that
competition will ensue.
The legal literature has suggested that innovation still takes place in the presence of weak
enforcement of IPR. In particular, in contrast with common wisdom, Hyde (2000) points out
that the Silicon Valley phenomenon cannot be understood without considering the weak IPR
enforcement guaranteed by the State of California.19 Hyde’s claims are based on the assumption
that when IPR are weak, information diffusion occurs. Therefore, he does not take into account
the incentives of firms to protect themselves against information leakage. In contrast, our model
accounts for the innovators’ incentives to protect their information.
Consider the high-tech industry in Silicon Valley, which is characterized by a very rapid growth
of markets, by a constantly increasing number of applications of high-tech ideas, and by a geo-
graphical concentration that facilitates communication. These facts suggest that π1, π2, and the
number of agents initially aware of new ideas are all high. Our results show that, in these cases,
competition will arise. This implies that information diffusion may occur, innovators will still
appropriate relatively high shares of the returns on their ideas, and ideas are likely to be fully
exploited and disclosed to stimulate future incremental research.
18See Boldrin and Levine (2003) for a similar conclusion drawn from a setting in which goods can be duplicated
and sold on perfectly competitive markets.
19California prohibits no-compete clauses (unless one of a number of exceptions are met). The application extent
of patents and copyrights in the software industry is also an issue that does not seem to have found a precise legal
answer yet (see Besen and Raskind (1991).
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5.1.2 Narrow Patents
Consider the monopoly market outcome that arises for high degrees of potential market compe-
tition (i.e., for very low levels of π1). Several points suggest that a narrow patent will be more
socially desirable in this case. First, a monopolistic outcome from the point of view of consumers
is indistinguishable from the introduction of a patent. Second, the monopoly outcome is based
on information remaining confined within the boundaries of the firm, implying that this outcome
precludes any potential information disclosure from the firm. This is not socially desirable as
information disclosure may stimulate incremental research and future discoveries.20 Finally, from
the point of view of the innovator’s incentives, we have shown that when monopoly is the market
outcome, the appropriation rate is the lowest possible. This is because the innovators have to
bear high costs to recruit all the informed agents, that in this equilibrium have high continuation
values. Thus, compared to the case of no intellectual property rights, the introduction of a narrow
patent should improve social welfare. This is because narrow patents capture the situations in
which the second firm markets a product very similar to the first one (i.e. low π1), but do not
apply to lower degrees of market competition, where the social costs of patent introduction may
be higher.21
5.2 Modeling Assumptions
Information Leakage. An important feature of our model is the presence of information leakage,
which is captured by the assumptions that developing an idea requires collaboration and that
collaboration entails information sharing. The first of these assumptions is motivated by a pro-
duction function increase in labor. Involving more people in the development stage may increase
productivity and quicken the development process. The second assumption is motivated by the
innovators’ incentives to inform their co-workers. Information is an input into the development
process; the more information is shared with co-workers, the more efficient the development stage
20 It has been observed (see Scotchmer (1991) and Scotchmer (1999)) that when one firm is the exclusive user
of a new technology (either because of secrecy or because of a patent), cumulative research may end up being
discouraged. This argument usually relies on the assumptions that either frictions or specialization prevent the first
patent-holder from fully exploiting all the applications of his patent.
21 If the degree of potential market competition is low, we can have a competitive market outcome. First, this
is desirable for consumers. Second, it allows for information disclosure, as agents do not have incentives to keep
information secret. This may stimulate incremental reseach. Finally, for high π1, the appropriation rates of
innovators are high, and their incentives to innovate are relatively protected.
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may be.
Therefore, the innovator faces a trade-off. On the one hand, he would like to collaborate with
a number of other agents and inform them. On the other hand, he has an incentive to hold
information back, as he fears information leakage and employee defection. Innovators will often
solve this trade-off by collaborating with some agents and sharing information to some extent.
In this paper, we abstract from the above trade-off by assuming that innovators must hire
a given number of agents and must share all of the information with them. The assumption
of information sharing should not be interpreted to mean that all the information is exchanged
immediately at the time of an offer. We prefer the point of view that contracts on undeveloped
ideas do not become immediately binding. However, there is a moment in which they do. This
moment occurs when the idea becomes well defined and when someone defecting from the original
team can still successfully compete with the other informed agents in the development process.
An agent can defect at any time between the moment at which he learns the information and the
moment at which the contract becomes binding.
Bargaining Protocol. The bargaining protocol we use in this paper is a natural benchmark
of the applied situation that we address. The symmetry of the probabilities with which nature
chooses the next proposer captures the symmetry among the informed agents. Once an agent is
made aware of the information, nothing differentiates him from the inventor. This implies that
every informed agent should have the same probability of being the next proposer. Similar results
to those reported in this paper arise in other specifications of the model. The analysis of an
alternative specification in which informed agents make simultaneous offers suggests the same
results, albeit a more cumbersome analysis.22
In our model, when an agent receives an offer, he is endowed with veto power on the success
of the offer itself (i.e., the offers are conditional upon the acceptance of all the agents included
in them). This assumption is motivated by our desire to provide those who are offered with
the opportunity to make a counteroffer, if they so desire. Relaxing this assumption would lead
to trivial, unrealistic equilibria in which innovators enjoy the non-pivotality of those to whom
they make an offer. Our assumption is consistent with similar models in the literature on intra-
firm bargaining. Both Stole and Zweibel (1996) and Wolinsky (2000) assume renegotiation of all
contracts once an agent has defected from the firm.
22The analysis of a bargaining protocol with simultaneous offers is available upon request. In particular, we show
the existence of the information diffusion effect in the simultaneous offer model.
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Market competition. In the presentation of the model, we restrict our attention to the case in
which π1+π2 ≤ 1— i.e., the presence of a second firm can only generate competition and dissipate
some of these rents. Relaxing this assumption and allowing for the case π1 + π2 > 1 requires us
to assume some frictions to prevent the first firm from developing both applications.23 However,
the analysis of the π1 + π2 > 1 case yields similar results.24
Equilibrium concept. Focusing on SSPE simplifies our analysis by making the computation of
the equilibrium continuation values sequence tractable. Enlarging the set of equilibria to all the
Subgame Perfect equilibria is likely to generate a high level of indeterminacy in the predictions
of the model. For instance, when π1 = 1, enlarging the set of equilibria to all the SPE leads to a
folk theorem in which any distribution of rents can be supported in equilibrium.
The focus on SSPE allows us to highlight the strategic aspects that are specific to our bargaining
model in contrast to other models of multi-agent bargaining. Our analysis introduces a novel
equilibrium effect that is driven by the endogeneity of the set of potential proposers. We show
that the implication of this effect is an asymmetry in the equilibrium payoffs that holds even as
bargaining frictions disappear.
Partial information leakage. Throughout the analysis, we assume that the act of hiring/developing
necessarily involves full sharing of the information about the idea. Obviously, this is a strong as-
sumption. Organizations find ways to secure information against insiders, as well as against
outside intruders. Information is often classified, and different agents gain access to different
pieces of information. These measures will tend to decrease the amount of information that the
innovator must share with potential employees. But as long as these measures are costly, some
information will always leak. One way to model such an extension is to assume an agent who re-
ceives an offer learns the idea with probability α ∈ [0, 1]. Again, we expect our qualitative results
to hold. When π1 = 1 and m = 1, the SSPE is still unique, and the payoff for the innovator is
higher than the payoff for the partner. For high n, the payoff to the innovator is 1αδ (1 − e−αδ),
which is higher than the payoff to the innovator when there is full information sharing. More-
23 e.g. timing problems, necessity to specialize, increasing management costs, etc.
24 In particular, if π1+π2 > 1, it can be easily checked that when all the n agents are informed, a grand coalition
offer costs at least (n− 1) δn . Then, whenever π1 > 1− δ, for a high enough number of informed agents competition
arises. Notice that the case π1 ≤ 1−δ is not consistent with the assumption π1 ≥ π2 in the case in which π1+π2 > 1.
This implies that, for high enough k, we always have a competitive market outcome. However, for lower k, we could
still have monopolistic market outcomes.
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over, the innovator’s appropriation rate is decreasing in α and reaches full appropriation when α
approaches zero.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we present a model of bargaining over new ideas. The model pins down the distrib-
ution of rents within the firm, reflecting the knowledge of agents about the idea. In addition, the
model determines the stability of a firm with respect to the introduction of an idea; depending on
the firm’s organization, new ideas can split the firm up into several groups competing with one
another.
From the point of view of an owner of a firm, the following two effects of innovation on his firm
determine his attitudes towards innovation. The introduction of a new ides within the firm implies
a reshuffling of the rents’ distribution. Often, innovation will bring new players into the picture
and the initial owner will have to forgo part of the pie to accommodate the new collaborators. If, as
a result of innovation, the firm splits up, rents are dissipated through the creation of competition.
An owner might fear the instability of his firm and, as a result, try to discourage such innovation
from arising.
The model analyzed in this paper provides a building block to understand the evolution of firms
in industries with high rates of innovation. In Baccara and Razin (2006), we take a step toward
studying the firm’s attitudes towards innovation and their relation to the way firms are organized.
References
[1] Aghion P. and J.Tirole (1994), “The Management of Innovation,” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 109.
[2] Anton J.J.and D.A.Yao (1994), “Expropriation and Inventions: Appropriable Rents in the
Absence of Property Rights,” American Economics Review, 84-1.
[3] Anton J.J.and D.A.Yao (1995), “Start-ups, Spin-offs and Internal Projects,” Journal of Law,
Economics and Organization, 11 (2).
[4] Arrow K. (1962), “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Inventions” in The
Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, Ed. Nelson, Princeton University Press.
23
[5] d’Aspremont C., S.Bhattacharya and L.A.Gerard-Varet (2000), ”Bargaining and Sharing
Innovative Knowledge,” Review of Economic Studies, 67, 255-271.
[6] Baccara M. and R.Razin (2006), “Curb Your Innovation: On the Relationship Between
Innovation and Governance Structure”, Mimeo.
[7] Baron D.P. and J.A. Ferejohn (1989), “Bargaining in Legislatures,” American Political Sci-
ence Review, 85.
[8] Boldrin M. and D.K. Levine (2003), “Perfectly Competitive Innovation,” Working Paper,
University of Minnesota.
[9] Boldrin M. and D.K. Levine (2004), “Rent-Seeking and Innovation,” Journal of Monetary
Economics, 51 (2004), 127-160.
[10] Chari V.V. and H.Hopenhayn (1991), “Vintage Human Capital, Growth, and the Diffusion
of New Technologies”, Journal of Political Economy, 99.
[11] Hyde A. (2000), “Working in Silicon Valley: Economic and Legal Analysis of a High-Velocity
Labor Market,” Unpublished Book Manuscript.
[12] Jovanovic B. and G.M. MacDonald (1994), “Competitive Diffusion,” Journal of Political
Economy, 102.
[13] Lester G. and E.Talley (2001), “Trade Secrets and Mutual Investments,” Working Paper,
University of Southern California.
[14] Pakes, A. and S. Nitzan (1983), "Optimum Contracts for Research Personnel, Research
Employment, and the Establishment of "Rival" Enterprises," Journal of Labor Economics,
Vol. 1 (4) pp. 345-65
[15] Rajan R.G. and L.Zingales (2001), “The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the
Origin and Growth of Firms,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116.
[16] Saxenian A. (1996), Regional Advantage : Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and
Route 128, Harvard University Press
[17] Stole L.A. and J. Zweibel (1994), “Intra Firm Bargaining Under Non Binding Contracts,”
The Review of Economic Studies, 63.
24
[18] Wolinsky A. (2000), “ A Theory of The Firm With Non Binding Employment Contracts,”
Econometrica, 69.
[19] Zabojnik J. (2002), “A Theory of Trade Secrets in Firms,” International Economic Review
43.
25
Appendix A
Definition of SSPE
Before we specify the notion of equilibrium we adopt, let us introduce the set of possible histories of this
game, H. The set H can be decomposed into the subsets HO, HR, HN and HT . The set HO includes
all the histories at which an agent is called to make an offer, and we denote by hi a generic history in
HO at which agent i is called to make an offer. The set HR includes all the histories at which agents are
simultaneously called to reply to an offer; the set HN includes all the histories at which nature chooses
the next proposer; and the set HT includes all the terminal histories. Every history in HO is followed by
a history in HR, and every history in HR is followed either by a history in HT or by a history in HN .
Every history in HN is followed by a history in HO. Let K (h) be the set of informed agents in the game
at history h ∈ H, and let k (h) ≡ card (K (h)).
For any player i ∈ N, a strategy si is defined for all histories in H at which agent i takes an action,
specifically for all histories in HO at which he is called to make an offer and all histories in HR at which
he is called to reply.
To define Symmetric Subgame Perfect Equilibria, we first have to require strategies to be anonymous.
Let σi be a mixed strategy of player i ∈ N . We say that σi is anonymous if at any history hi ∈ HO, σi (hi)
can be described by a triple
¡
nI , nU , γ
¢
, where nI and nU are the number of informed and uninformed
agents getting the offer, respectively, and γ is the vector of shares offered to each agent.25 The agents
included in the offer are randomly chosen from among the two groups.26 The vector γ has dimension
nI + nU . The first nI elements, the shares offered to the informed agents, are all equal to γI and the
remaining nU elements, the shares offered to the uninformed agents, are all equal to γU .27
Definition 1 A Subgame Perfect equilibrium is Symmetric if σi is anonymous for any i ∈ N and
at any hi, hj ∈ HO following the same history h ∈ N , σi (hi) and σj (hj) can be described by the
same triple
¡
nI , nU , γ
¢
. Moreover, at any h0 ∈ HR, σi (h0) and σj (h0) are the same for any i and
j who are playing at h0.
25This implies that nI ∈ {0, 1, ..k (hi)− 1}, nU ∈ {0, 1, .., n− k (hi)} , and γ is such that γ ≥ 0 andP
i γi ≤ 1.
26Then, since at history hi there are card (K (hi) \ {i}) informed agents and card (N\K (hi)) uninformed
agents, each informed agent gets the offer with probability n
I
card(K(hi)\{i}) , and each uninformed agent gets
the offer with probability n
U
card(N\K(hi)) .
27More generally, we could allow for any mixture of these strategies. The results would remain the same
under this alternative formulation.
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Proof of Proposition 1: (i) Focus on a subgame where all n agents are informed. Then, any
proposer can make an offer to one agent and guarantee himself π1 − δn (by symmetry,
δ
n is the maximum
possible continuation value of another player), or he can make a grand coalition offer. If he makes a grand
coalition offer, as π1+ δπ2 < 1, the least he has to pay each player is δn (π1 + δπ2), so that the minimum
cost of the offer is (n− 1) δn (π1 + δπ2) . Notice that, under our assumption, if n is high enough, we have
1−δ (n− 1)
n
(π1 + δπ2)≤ π1−
δ
n
This implies that making a sub-coalition offer dominates making a grand-coalition offer. Consider a
subgame in which n − 1 agents are informed. If a proposer makes a sub-coalition offer, the one that
maximizes his payoff is making an offer to the only uninformed, which yields at least π1 − δn . If he makes
a grand coalition offer, he gets at most 1− δ(n−2)n (π1 + δπ2) . Again, under our assumptions for n high
enough the first option dominates the first. Thus, setting k = n− 1 concludes the proof¥
(ii) Suppose that n agents are informed. Then, we have that making a sub-coalition offer costs at least
δ π1+δπ2n , and a grand coalition offer costs at most (n− 1)
δ
n . This implies that a grand coalition arises if
π1−δ π1+δπ2n < 1−(n− 1)
δ
n , which is equivalent to π1
¡
1− δn
¢
< 1−(n− 1) δn+
δ2π2
n =
n−δ(n−1)+δ2π2
n ,
or π1 <
n−(n−1)δ+δ2π2
n−δ , which is satisfied by assumption. Then, we have vn =
δ
n . Let us move to a subgame
where n−1 agents are informed. Any chosen proposer can offer to all the other players and pay (n− 1) δn ,
he can decide to make an offer only to the other n− 2 informed players, paying each at most δn−1 (in this
case he pays at most (n− 2) δn−1 < (n− 1)
δ
n); or he can decide to offer only to the only uninformed
player and get π1 − δn . Observe that π1 −
δ
n < 1− (n− 2)
δ
n−1 if π1 < 1− (n− 2)
δ
n−1 +
δ
n . However,
we have
π1<
n− (n− 1) δ + δ2π2
n− δ < 1−
n− 2
n
δ < 1− (n− 2) δ
n− 1+
δ
n
This guarantees that vn−1 = δn−1 . Assume now as an inductive hypothesis that vk+1 =
δ
k+1 and in
all the subgames with k + 1 or more agents informed, only informed agents receive offers. Then, focus
on a subgame starting with k agents informed. Every proposer has the choice of making a sub-coalition
offer, exactly a grand coalition offer or a more extended grand coalition offer. In the last case, he has
to pay (h− 1) δh with h ≥ k + 1, while with an offer made only to informed agents, he pays at most
(k − 1) δk < (h− 1)
δ
h for h ≥ k + 1. Making a sub-coalition offer yields π1 −
δ
k+1 . We have that
π1 − δk+1 < 1− (k − 1)
δ
k if π1 < 1− (k − 1)
δ
k +
δ
k+1 , but we have
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π1<
n− (n− 1) δ + δ2π2
n− δ < 1−
n− 2
n
δ < 1− (k − 1) δ
k
+
δ
k + 1
This concludes the proof of (ii).
(iii) Let us build a SSPE in which at any history h ∈ HO such that k(h) > k¯, all the informed agents at
a history h offer a grand coalition if chosen by nature as next proposers (subgame of type 1). If one of the
players chooses to offer the grand coalition, let all the players offer an uninformed player in the subsequent
subgame. To support a subgame in which all the players make an offer to an uninformed player (subgame
of type 2), let all the players make grand coalition offers in the subsequent subgame. Then, we have
v1k =
δ
k
¡
1− (k − 1) v2k
¢
+
δ (k − 1)
k
v2k
v2k =
δ
k
¡
π1 − v1k+1
¢
+
δ (k − 1)
k
π2v∗k−1
Notice that limk v1k = limk v
2
k = 0. To check if a subgame of type 1 is a SSPE, we show that
1− (k − 1) v2k> π1 (1)
Notice that limk
£
1− (k − 1) v2k
¤
= 1 − δπ1 − δ2π2 > π1, so for high k (1) is satisfied. Also, we
need to check that it is not optimal to offer to more than the grand coalition, but we can sustain this by
imposing a type 1 subgame upon rejection. Therefore we must have
1− (k − 1) v2k> 1− (k +m− 1) v1k+m
or
(k − 1) v2k< (k +m− 1) v1k+m
This is satisfied as limk (k − 1) v2k = δπ1 + δ2π2 and limk→∞ (k +m− 1) v1k+m = δ. Moreover, we
know that δπ1 + δ2π2 > δ as π1 < 1−δ
2π2
1+δ < 1− δπ2.
Now, to check the sustainability of the subgames of type 2, we need to check that
π1 − v1k+1> 1− (k − 1) v1k (2)
But we have limk
£
1− (k − 1) v1k
¤
= limk→∞
n
1− (k − 1)
h
δ
k
¡
1− (k − 1) v2k
¢
+ δ(k−1)k v
2
k
io
= 1− δ < π1, so that (2) is satisfied as well.¥
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Proof of Proposition 2 The sequence {vk}nk=2 of the continuation values of the informed play-
ers at the beginning of a renegotiation subgame with k informed player is defined by vn = δn , vk =
δ
k
¡
1− (n− k) δn
¢
for n−m ≤ k < n and vk = δk
¡
1−mvmk+m
¢
for k < n−m.
We show that this is the only SSPE by backward induction on the number of informed agents k. Let all
the n agents be informed. Then, symmetry guarantees that vn = δn .
Let now the number of informed people be n− 1. Any proposer can involve the only uninformed agent
in his offer or decide to offer only to informed agents. If the offers includes the uninformed, each player
included in the offer has a reservation value of δn .
We claim that if the offer does not involve the uninformed agent, each player has to be paid at least
δ
n−1
¡
1−m δn
¢
+ δ(m−1)n−1
δ
n . To prove this claim, observe that, upon rejection, an informed agent, say i, will
be the next proposer with probability 1n−1 and in that case he could decide to make an offer involving the
uninformed, and get
¡
1−m δn
¢
. If he is not chosen as next proposer (an event that occurs with probability
n−2
n−1 ), only two cases are possible: the next proposer is going to include the uninformed in the offer, or the
next proposer is not going to include the uninformed in the offer. In the first case, symmetry guarantees
that player i is going to be included in the offer with probability not inferior to m−1n−2 (the probability will
be greater if the offer involves more than m people) and he gets δn , while in the second case, symmetry
guarantees that player i is going to be included in the offer with probability not inferior to mn−2 and that
the least he gets is
δ(1− δn)
n−1 as the entire pie to share among all the agents is δ, while a maximum of
δ
n can
be appropriated by the uninformed. Then, we have that the expected value in the first and second cases
are respectively, m−1n−2
δ
n and
m
n−2
δ(1− δn)
n−1 . It is easy to see that
m−1
n−2
δ
n <
m
n−2
δ(1− δn)
n−1 . This implies our
claim. In fact, if the offer does not involve the uninformed agent, each player has to be paid at least
δ
n− 1
µ
1−mδ
n
¶
+
n− 2
n− 1
δ (m− 1)
n− 2
δ
n
=
δ
n− 1
µ
1−mδ
n
¶
+
δ (m− 1)
n− 1
δ
n
=
δ
n− 1
µ
1− δ
n
¶
>
δ
n
which guarantees that including the uninformed in the offer dominates not doing it. This implies that
vn−1=
δ
n− 1
µ
1− δ
n
¶
Notice that vn−1 < 2vn.
Let us now fix k + 1 > n−m and assume as an inductive hypothesis that for all n− 2 ≥ h ≥ k + 1,
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we have that in all the subgames starting with h agents informed, all the available n − h uninformed
agents are offered, and the remaining m− n+ h agents necessary to form the firm are chosen with equal
probability among the informed ones. Also, vh > vh+1 and svh+1+s < (s+ 1) vh+2+s. Let us now
focus on a subgame starting with k informed agents. Observe that any proposer, say i, can exhaust the
uninformed agents and pay δn each, or decide to substitute some uninformed agents with informed ones.
If he chooses the second option and offers to, say s > 0, uninformed agents, he has to pay each agent
vk+s. However, by our inductive hypothesis, vk+h > δn . This implies that offering to all uninformed
dominates this option. Suppose, then, that s = 0, meaning that proposer i offers only to informed agents.
Observe that, in this case, the reservation value of each agent who gets the offer, say agent j, is at least
δ
k
¡
1−m δn
¢
+ δ(k−1)k
m
k−1
δ
k . In fact, notice that symmetry guarantees that if agent i does not offer to any
uninformed agent, the other agents do not do so either. This implies that 1k is the probability of being
chosen as the next proposer; 1 − m δn is the payoff he can guarantee himself in that event;
k−1
k is the
probability of not being chosen as the next proposer; mk−1 is the probability that agent j is included in the
offer of someone else, and δk is the minimum value agent j will be offered. However, notice that
δ
k
µ
1−mδ
n
¶
+
δ (k − 1)
k
m
k − 1
δ
k
=
δ
k
µ
1−mδ
n
¶
+ δ
m
k
δ
k
=
δ
k
µ
1−mδ
n
+ δ
m
k
¶
>
δ
n
This implies that, again, offering to all available uninformed agents dominates offering to only informed
agents. For k ≥ n−m, we have
vk =
δ
k
µ
1−mδ
n
¶
+
δ (k − 1)
k
m− n+ k
k − 1
δ
n
=
δ
k
µ
1− (n− k) δ
n
¶
Notice also that vk > vk+1 as
vk =
δ
k
∙
1− (n− k) δ
n
¸
>
δ
k + 1
∙
1− (n− k − 1) δ
n
¸
= vk+1
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and
vk+1
vk
=
k
k + 1
£
1− (n− k − 1) δn
¤£
1− (n− k) δn
¤
>
k
k + 1
which conclude the inductive proof for k ≥ n−m.
To complete the construction of the equilibrium sequence, take as the first step of the new induction the
subgame in which k = n−m, for which we already know that
vn−m=
δ
n−m(1−m
δ
n
) =
δ
n−m(
n− δm
n
)
We have already showed that vn−m > vn−m+1 and that
vn−m+1
vn−m
> n−mn−m+1 . Let us now fix k < n−m
and assume as an inductive hypothesis that for h ≥ k + 1, we have vh > vh+1 and vh+1vh >
h
h+1 , so that
offers are always made to exactly m uninformed agents. Focus now on a subgame starting with k agents
informed. If a proposer offers only to uninformed agents, he has to pay each of them vk+m. If he offers to
s < m uninformed agents, he has to pay each agent vk+s, but we know by our inductive hypothesis that
vk+s > vk+m, so it is optimal to offer to all uninformed agents instead. Finally, suppose the proposer
offers only to m informed agents. In this case, each of them has to be paid at least δk (1−mvk+m) .
However, notice that
δ
k
(1−mvk+m)> vk+m
as by inductive hypothesis vk+m ≤ δk+m . It is, then, always optimal to extend the offer only to unin-
formed agents. For k ≤ n−m, we have
vk=
δ
k
(1−mvk+m)
Moreover, notice that for all such k, we have vk < δk and v
m
k >
δ
k
³
k+m(1−δ)
k+m
´
. We have
vk−1
vk
=
δ
k−1 (1−mvk−1+m)
δ
k (1−mvk+m)
=
k
k − 1
(1−mvk−1+m)
(1−mvk+m)
>
k
k − 1
(1−mvk−1+m)³
1−m mm+1vk−1+m
´
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as vk+mvk+m−1 >
k+m−1
k+m >
m
m+1 . Now, observe that
∂ (1−mx)
(1−m mm+1x)
∂x
= −m m+ 1
(−m− 1 +m2x)2
< 0
and
∂
h
k−1+m(1−δ)
k−1+m(1− mm+1 δ)
i
∂δ
=
−m (k − 1 +m) (m+ 1)
(− (k − 1)m− (k − 1)−m2 −m+m2δ)2
< 0
Therefore, we have
vk−1
vk
>
k
k − 1
(1−mvk−1+m)³
1−m mm+1vk−1+m
´
>
k
k − 1
³
1−m δk−1+m
´
³
1−m mm+1
δ
k−1+m
´
>
k
k − 1
k − 1 +m(1− δ)
k − 1 +m(1− mm+1δ)
>
k
k − 1
k − 1
k − 1 + mm+1
=
k
k − 1 + ( mm+1)
> 1
Finally, we have vkvk−1 >
k−1
k as
vk
vk−1
=
δ
k (1−mvk+m)
δ
k−1 (1−mvk−1+m)
=
k − 1
k
(1−mvk+m)
(1−mvk−1+m)
>
k − 1
k
Proof of Corollary 3: Focus on the case in which n is large. For any number of players n and any
optimal firm size m+1, Proposition 1 guarantees that there exists a unique SSPE such that the sequence
of continuation values is {vk}nk=1 Such a sequence is such that vm+1 is defined as
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vm+1 =
δ
m+ 1
(1−mvm2m+1)
=
δ
m+ 1
(1−m( δ
2m+ 1
(1−m( δ
3m+ 1
(1−m (....))))))
≈
max{j|jm+1≤n}X
i=1
δi(m)i−1 (−1)i−1Qi
s=1 (sm+ 1)
This can be approximated for large n by
vm+1 w
∞X
i=1
δi(m)i−1 (−1)i−1Qi
s=1 (sm+ 1)
The innovator’s appropriation rate is v(m, δ,∞) ≡ 1−mvm+1 (∞) , which for large m is approximated
by
v(∞, δ,∞) ≡ lim
m→∞
v(m, δ,∞)= 1− lim
m→∞
m
∞X
i=1
δimi−1 (−1)i−1Qi
s=1 (sm+ 1)
= e−δ
≥ e−1 > 0
As δ tends to 1, we have limδ→1 v(∞, δ,∞) = e−1 ' 0.368¥
Proof of Proposition 4:We need to show that there is eπ (π2, δ, n) < 1 such that if π1 > eπ (π2, δ, n),
then always offering one uninformed agent is an equilibrium. In this strategy profile, the continuation value
sequence is {vk}nk=2 defined by vn = δn (π1 + δπ2) and vk = δk (π1 − vk+1) + δ(k−1)k π2vBk−1, where we
denote by {v∗k}nk=2 the (unique) SSPE sequence we studied in the π1 = 1, π2 = 0 case (observe that after
the formation of the first firm, if k informed agents are left on the market, each agent has a continuation
value of δπ2v∗k). To show that this is an equilibrium, we need to prove that the sequence {vk}nk=2 is
decreasing, that mvk+m < (m+ 1) vk+m+1 for all k and m such that 1 ≤ m ≤ n − k − 1, and
that offering to one uninformed agent always dominates making a grand-coalition offer. Let us first
show that the sequence {vk}nk=2 is decreasing and that mvk+m < (m+ 1) vk+m+1 for all k,m. To
see that {vk}nk=2 is decreasing, notice that we have vk = δk (π1 − vk+1) + δ(k−1)k π2v∗k−2 and vn =
δ
n (π1 − vn) +
δ(n−1)
n (
1
n−1vn +
n−2
n−1π2v
∗
n−2) where v
∗
n−2 =
δ
n−2 . Therefore, vn =
δ
n(π1 + δπ2) and for
any k ≤ n we have
lim
π1→1
vk = lim
π1→1
δ
k
(π1 − vk+1) +
δ (k − 1)
k
π2v∗k−2 =
= v∗k > v
∗
k+1 = limπ1→1
vk+1
33
In the same way, it is easy to see that
lim
π1→1
[(m+ 1) vk+m+1] > lim
π1→1
[vk+1mvk+m]
for all 1 ≤ m ≤ n − k − 1. So, there exists π0 (π2, δ, n) < 1 such that for all π1 ≥ π0 (π2, δ, n) the
sequence {vk}nk=2 is decreasing and satisfies mvk+m < (m+ 1) vk+m+1.
To show that offering to one uninformed agent always dominates making a grand-coalition offer we need
π1−
δ (π1 − vk+2) + δkπ2v∗k
k + 1
> 1− (k − 1)
δ (π1 − vk+1) + δ (k − 1)π2v∗k−1
k
(3)
for all k. Notice that
lim
π1→1
h
π1 − δ(π1−vk+2)+δkπ2v
∗
k
k+1
i
1− v∗k+1
> 1− (k − 1) v∗k =
lim
π1→1
h
1− (k − 1) δ(π1−vk+1)+δ(k−1)π2v
∗
k−1
k
i
for all k. So, by continuity with respect to π1, there is π00 (π2, δ, n) < 1, such that for all π1 ≥
π00 (π2, δ, n) , (3) is satisfied for all k. Define the bound eπ (π2, δ, n) ≡ max [π0 (π2, δ, n) , π00 (π2, δ, n)] .
Notice that the generic element of the sequence {vk}nk=2 for n going to infinity is
vk =
δ
k
(π1 − vk+1) +
δ (k − 1)
k
π2vBk−1
=
δ
k
∙
π1 −
µ
δ
k + 1
(π1 − ...) +
δk
k + 1
π2vBk
¶¸
+
δ (k − 1)
k
π2vBk−1
=
∞X
i=1
∙
π1(−1)i−1δi(k − 1)!
(k − 1 + i)!
+
δi
k
(1 + (k + i)π2
∞X
j=1
δj
(k + i)!
(k + i+ j)!
(−1)j−1))
⎤
⎦
which is increasing in both π1 and π2. This implies that the appropriation rate of the innovator,
v (δ) = 1− v2, is decreasing in π1¥
34
